The Importance of Being Empirical by Heise, Michael
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 26




The Importance of Being Empirical
Michael Heise
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Legal Education Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Heise The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (1999)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol26/iss4/3
The Importance of Being Empirical
Michael Heise*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 808
H1. WHY MORE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Is NOT EMPIRICAL .............. 810
A. The (Relative) Dearth of Empirical Legal Scholarship ......... 810
B. Some Consequences of this Dearth ......................... 813
C. Reasons for this Dearth ................ : ................ 815
1. It is Hard W ork ................................. 816
2. Lack of Training ................................ 817
3. Exposure to Falsification Through Replication ........ 818
4. Lack of Prestige ................................ 819
5. Lack of Internal Institutional Incentives ............. 820
6. Lack of External Institutional Incentives ............. 822
III. NuIus IN VERBA: EMERGING TYPES OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP ............................................. 824
IV. THE PEPPERDINE STUDY ..................................... 829
V. CONCLUSION .............................................. 833
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University
of Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University. Dan Cole, David Hyman, Ron Krotoszynski, and Dawn




In a recent informative article on the exclusionary rule published in the Iowa
Law Review (the Pepperdine Study), Professors L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell
Caldwell, Carol A. Chase, and Ronald W. Fagan explored certain aspects of the
rule's effects and costs, particularly as they relate to police conduct.' The topic
explored in their paper is interesting and, due to recent events, timely. Its
timeliness stems from the conflation of two distinct but related trends. One trend
is increased public dissatisfaction with consequences of the exclusionary rule's
application. Another is increased public criticism of judges. Both of these trends
converged in events following a recent exclusionary rule decision by Federal
District Court Judge Baer, Jr.2 Not surprisingly, the Pepperdine Study begins with
a brief recounting of those events, which quickly have become a fixture in judicial
folklore.3
That a single anecdote commands such attention should surprise few.
Assertions unconnected to an empirical basis fill law review articles (and judicial
opinions).' Anecdotal evidence is comparatively simple and transparent, requiring
little expertise to generate the expected reaction.' Regrettably, however, scholars
possess few, if any, mechanisms to assess anecdotal evidence for truthfulness,
typicality, or frequency.6 Lacking such mechanisms, anecdotal evidence supplies
a risky foundation upon which to form generalizations applicable to a larger
population. Yet, the influence of some anecdotes, including the Judge Baer
1. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83
IOWA L. REV. 669, 674-78 (1998).
2. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
3. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 671-72. Judge Baer originally ruled 80 pounds of cocaine and
heroin found by police officers inadmissible due to the absence of reasonable suspicion necessary to
stop the defendant's car and conduct a warrantless search. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 242-43. Judge
Baer's decision attracted intense public criticism. Judge Baer subsequently reversed himself. See
Bayless, 921 F. Supp. at 217. The judge's decisions prompted commentary from, among others, the
American Bar Association, President Clinton, and Speaker Gingrich. See Ian Fisher, Gingrich Asks
[for] Judge's Ouster for Ruling Out Drug Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at B4 (noting that
Speaker Gingrich sent a letter to President Clinton asking him to seek Judge B aer's resignation); Allison
Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al (reporting President
Clinton's spokesperson, Michael D. McCurry, as stating that President Clinton regrets Judge Baer's
decision and is contemplating asking for his resignation); Press Release from the ABA, ABA House of
Delegates Votes to Support Judges Against Unwarranted Attacks, (visited Feb. 10, 1998)
<http://www.abanet.org/media/feb98/judnash.html>.
4. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 (1986) [hereinafter Posner,
Summary].
5. See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 800-01 (1998).
6. See id. at 801 n. 16; see also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1159-61 (1992) (discussing
problems associated with the use of anecdotal evidence).
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incident, on courts and legislatures is legion.7 Thus, for an empirical study such as
Pepperdine's to begin with a prominent anecdote is ironic because data-not
anecdotes-inform this study.
The Pepperdine Study warrants attention not only for what it says about the
exclusionary rule but also for how it says it. I leave to others to comment more
directly on the study's findings, specific contributions to our understanding of the
exclusionary rule, as well as the usefulness of the authors' proposed civil
administrative remedy. My comments, in contrast, dwell on how the authors
marshal their evidence and advance their argument. Specifically, I focus on the
authors' deployment of data and statistical analyses-rather than theory or
anecdotes-to advance their thesis. The Pepperdine Law Review's generous
invitation to comment on the Pepperdine Study provides an appropriate opportunity
to consider-albeit briefly-the decidedly small but growing subset of legal
scholarship that is empirical, take stock of this particular research genre as well as
the Pepperdine Study's contribution to it, and articulate a normative argument in
favor of increased empirical legal research.'
To place the Pepperdine Study into some context, Part II considers the
practical and structural factors that work against the production of empirical
scholarship by law professors. Despite important impediments, important empirical
legal scholarship continues to emerge and at an increasingly rapid rate.' Part IlI
describes three broad types of empirical legal scholarship and argues that increased
attention to it will enhance and complement legal scholarship as a whole.' In Part
IV the Pepperdine Study is discussed within the context of the small but growing
corpus of empirical legal research."
7. For a comprehensive and recent analysis of anecdotal evidence see generally Hyman, supra note
5 (describing the influence of anecdotal evidence and a narrative on patient-dumping legislation).
8. I acknowledge from the outset, with no small irony, my normative argument in favor of
empirical legal scholarship. Moreover, Iremain cognizant that partsof my analysis rely upon little more
than anecdotal or impressionistic evidence borne largely out of my experiences as a law professor.
Although I remain quite partial toward empirical legal scholarship, I concluded that this particular
occasion-a comment upon the work of colleagues-was neither optimal nor appropriate for a full-blown
empirical study of empirical legal scholarship. Such a study, however, should be undertaken.
9. See infra notes 12-94 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
1. See infra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.
II. WHY MORE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IS NOT EMPIRICAL
For better or worse (or, more precisely, for better and worse), law professors
produce most legal scholarship. 2 Formal post-graduate educational training for
most American law professors took place in law rather than graduate schools.
Despite a discernible increase in law faculty hiring of candidates with multiple
graduate degrees (e.g., J.D./Ph.D.), 13 law professors possessing either law and
graduate degrees or, even less common, law professors possessing a graduate but
not a law degree, remain the clear exception and not the rule. As I argue below,
both of these factors-that law professors generate much of the legal scholarship
and that most law professors lack formal non-legal graduate school training-fuel
the relative dearth of empirical legal research.
A. The (Relative) Dearth of Empirical Legal Scholarship
Before I develop my argument, three prefatory points require attention. First,
some definitions are in order. 4 For purposes of this Article, when I speak of
empirical legal scholarship I refer only to the subset of empirical legal scholarship
that uses statistical techniques and analyses. By statistical techniques and analyses
I mean studies that employ data (including systematically coded judicial opinions)
that facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a larger sample or population as well
as replication by other scholars. 5 Admittedly, my narrow definition of empirical
legal scholarship excludes a rich array of legal scholarship that can plausibly be
construed as empirical. However, my narrow definition has the advantage of
focusing on one of the more visible and distinct types of empirical legal scholarship
and more clearly off-setting it from its more traditional theoretical and doctrinal
12. It is axiomatic that important contributions to legal scholarship have emerged from scholars not
associated with, formally or informally, any law school.
13. See Graham C. Lilly, Law Schools Without Lawyers? Winds of Change in Legal Education,
81 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1428-29, 1440-41 (1995). Also, in a recent study of law faculty hiring, Professors
Merritt and Reskin noted that law faculty candidates can enhance their chances of teaching at an "elite"
law school by possessing a "doctoral degree in a field other than law." See Deborah Jones Merritt &
Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty
Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199,240 (1997). It is also plausible to assume that the same pattern might
also prevail at a non-elite law school as well. However, because the Merritt Study employs logistic
regression, all that can properly be inferred is the independent influence of a law faculty candidate's
possession of a doctoral degree, typically the Ph.D., on law faculty hiring. See id. Because some law
school faculties, notably those at tlle elite law schools, include faculty with Ph.D.'s but not J.D.'s, we
cannot draw any proper inferences about any possible interactive effect. See id. at 240 tbl.4. That is
to say, the Merritt Study does not generate and analyze a new variable designed to capture the potential
independent interaction of a law faculty candidate possessing both the J.D. and the Ph.D. See id.
14. The definitions that follow borrow from and expand upon definitions articulated earlier by
Professor Schuck. See Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?,
39 J. LEGAL EDUc. 323,323-24 (1989) [hereinafter Schuck, Why].
15. See id.
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counterparts.
Second, my argument that legal scholarship can be enhanced by more attention
to empirical research is not new.1 The argument benefits from "a long and
distinguished pedigree."' 7 Indeed, such calls for increased attention to empirical
legal scholarship date back at least as far as the close of the last century when
Justice Holmes opined about the future influence of "the man of statistics" on the
law.' One generation later, Roscoe Pound urged legal scholars to complement
scholarship on doctrinal and theoretical law with studies of "the law in action."' 9
Legal Realists, including Professors Charles E. Clark, William 0. Douglas, and
Underhill Moore, attempted but in large measure failed in their efforts to elevate
empirical legal scholarship's stature within the legal academy."0 Among the more
prominent legal academics currently urging less neglect of empirical legal
scholarship are Judge Posner and Professors Schuck, Bok, and Friedman, to name
only a few.'
16. Indeed, many have urged this point. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 210
(1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw]; Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System ofLaw Practice and
Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 581-82 (1983); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 779-80 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Against]; Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 323. In
the interests of full disclosure I include myself among those who urge more empirical legal scholarship.
Moreover, much-but not all-of my scholarship is empirical. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting
the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377, 1385-92 (1998) (Michael Heise, co-author); Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity,
Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective, 32 GA.
L. REV. 543,545-49 (1998) [hereinafter Heise, Equal]; Michael Heise,Assessing the Efficacy of School
Desegregation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1093,.1113 (1996); Michael Heise, The Courts vs. Educational
Standards, 120 PUB. INTEREST 55, 61-62 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation,
Educational Finance, and Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1750-51
(1995) [hereinafter Heise, State].
17. See Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 324.
18. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187
(1920).
19. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AMER. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910).
20. Possible reasons for the Legal Realists' failure are discussed in JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) [hereinafter SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN]. On a
related point, Professor Schlegel argues that among the core group of legal realists Professor Underhill
Moore's contribution to empirical legal scholarship has thus far failed to receive its due recognition.
See John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of
Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195, 200-01 (1980) [hereinafter Schlegel, Moore]. I share
Professor Schlegel's bewilderment on this point, as I too deem Professor Moore's contribution
important and curiously underappreciated.
21. See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 16, at 210 (1995); Bok, supra note 16, at 581-82;
Posner, Against, supra note 16, at 3; Schuck, Why, supra note 14; Friedman, supra note 16, at 768-69.
Third, any argument (such as mine) that too little legal scholarship is empirical
begs one important question: Too little compared to what? Admittedly, a wholly
satisfactory response to this question eludes. Although it remains far from clear
what empirical legal scholarship's appropriate or optimal production level might
be, a few factors suggest that more scholarship is desirable. One such factor is that
a growing number of legal scholars increasingly call for more empirical legal
scholarship.22 Although commentators recognize the increased need ("demand")
for empirical work, the production of such work ("supply") has not yet responded
adequately. 23 In one brief survey, an overwhelming majority of law professors
sampled agreed that there is a lack or shortage of empirical research in legal
scholarship.
24
Another factor is that the amount of theoretical and doctrinal scholarship that
presently fills many law review pages overwhelms the amount of empirical
scholarship. A quick glance at the current production of legal scholarship will
convince most readers that an empirical research presence within the academic
literature is marginal, at best. While Professor Schuck's earlier observation that the
two main forms of legal scholarship-theoretical and doctrinal-account for "almost
the entire corpus of legal scholarship, 25 remains largely accurate, it is especially
accurate if one views legal scholarship in its entirety.
However, more recent trends in legal scholarship point in a different direction.
Although empirical legal scholarship remains the overwhelming exception to a
general rule favoring non-empirical research, evidence suggests that the production
of empirical legal scholarship is on the rise. This trend is particularly clear if one
reviews only legal scholarship published during the past decade.26 Thus, the role
of empirical legal research, inside and outside American law schools, grows,
though in a somewhat halting manner.27
22. See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 16, at 210; Bok, supra note 16, at 581-82; Posner,
Against, supra note 16, at 3; Friedman, supra note 16, at 763-64; Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 323;
Bryant G. Garth, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 606,606 n. I (1995) (reviewing SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN, supra note
20) [hereinafter Garth, Book Review].
23. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Observations OnAn Uncomfortable Relationship: CivilProcedure
and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 105 (1997) [hereinafter Garth, Observations].
24. See Craig A. Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the
Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347,362 tbl. 1 (1995). Professor Nard's study was
a brief and informal telephone survey of 40 "randomly selected" law professors from 20 different law
schools. See id. at 361 nn.70 & 71. Given the limits of Professor Nard's study, any conclusions or
inferences drawn should be done with extreme caution.
25. See Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 329.
26. My impression is shared by others. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 24, at 361 n.68. For evidence
that doctrinal works' relative share is slipping, see for example William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Heavily Cited Articles in Law, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 825, 830 tbl. 1 (1996).
27. See Garth, Observations, supra note 23, at 104. The Federal Judicial Center, established in
1967, fueled some early empirical work. See Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of
Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31
(1988).
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B. Some Consequences of This Dearth
The dearth of empirically-moored legal scholarship has consequences,
including some that law professors should not take lightly.28 Some commentators
argue that legal scholarship's weak empirical mooring undermines efforts to make
the legal system more accessible and efficient for people.29 Others suggest that an
increase in empirical legal scholarship will help ease the growing rift separating
legal scholarship from the legal profession.3" Courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have used social science evidence for decades.3' Its use by
litigants has become almost routine. Yet, in a few opinions the Justices appear to
lament the absence of helpful empirical research and almost invite research
efforts.32 The legal academy, if it was so inclined, could become even more
relevant to the judiciary and Bar by producing more empirical research. Less dire
and more narrowly predicted consequences which flow from a relative dearth of
empirical legal scholarship include the potential for collateral harm to other legal
scholarship genres, especially the more favored theoretical. The development of
good theories is made even more difficult without the benefit of good data.33
Likewise, the lack of an empirical footing poses a threat to legal theory's
persuasiveness and influence.34
28. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 16, at 582 (arguing that law professors (and, presumably, university
presidents) ignore important empirical needs of our legal scholarship "at our own peril").
29. See, e.g.,id. at 581.
30. See Nard, supra note 24, at 348, 368. For a robust discussion about the growing separation of
legal scholarship and the legal profession, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992); Harry T.
Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Legal Profession, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285, 291
(1988); Harry H. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37
J. LEGAL EDUC. 327, 327 (1987). For a dissenting view see POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note
16, at 91-108 (criticizing Judge Edwards' critique of legal scholarship).
31. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 93 n.4 (1993); John Monahan & Laurens Walker,
Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 477 (1986).
32. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578 (1981). "Whatever may be the 'mischievous
potentialities [of broadcast coverage] for intruding upon the detached atmosphere which should always
surround the judicial process,' at present no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient to
establish that the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect ...." See id.
(quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587 (1965)).
33. See Bok, supra note 16, at 581.
34. See Posner, Against, supra note 16, at 3.
Another argument for more empirical legal scholarship stems from theoretical
scholarship's propensity for the normative.35 It is at least hoped that empirical
scholarship can more easily separate the normative from the descriptive and better
maintain neutrality. Of course, this remains just a hope. It is perhaps unavoidable
that research questions are posed for a reason and that "all measurement is lightly
or heavily scented with the values of those whose hands who are on the switch."3 6
However, empirical legal scholars, or at least the best of them, endeavor to
approach their research questions objectively and their methodology of empirical
choice facilitates as much objectivity as is humanly possible. It is certainly true
that statistics can "lie" and perhaps even do so badly. 37 It is naive, though however
regrettable, to assume the contrary. Although purportedly "value free" empirical
analyses can be generated to support almost any particular viewpoint," empirical
methodologies, conventions, and norms make such efforts decidedly more difficult
to mask. This is particularly true for a community of scholars that values and
practices honorable peer-review and replication of work. 3
Even if my argument that too little empirical legal scholarship is being
produced persuades, it does not necessarily follow that law professors should
adjust their research agendas to address this need. Perhaps this need is better met
by political scientists, economists, or others not formally associated with law
faculties and more likely fluent in empirical research methodologies. Of course,
the need for increased empirical legal scholarship is important enough not to be
overly concerned about who actually does or does not do the work. However,
when fingers begin pointing they typically do so first at law professors.
Common sense suggests that law professors should respond to the need for
more empirical legal scholarship. Some scholars bluntly assert that if empirical
legal research is to go forward legal scholars "must" help organize and participate
in it, albeit with the aid, where necessary of interested scholars from other
disciplines.' Posner suggests that "in any sensible division of responsibilities
among branches of the legal profession the task of conducting detailed empirical
35. See id.
36. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 780.
37. As Mark Twain once noted: "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics."
MARK TWAIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924), reprinted in TH4E OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
187 (3rd ed. 1979) (Mark Twain attributed the quote to Benjamin Disraeli).
38. See Hyman, supra note 5, at 846; see also R.H. Coase, How Should Economists Choose?, in
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 15, 27 (1994) ("[I]f you torture the data enough, nature will
always confess."); James P. Scanlan, The Perils of Provocative Statistics, 102 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1991).
39. Almost all academics, as well as a surprisingly large number of law professors, find the absence
of blind peer-review at most law reviews, certainly the student-edited ones, almost scandalous. The
labor-economic dimensions to this debate are considered elsewhere. For a conference devoted to the
state of law reviews as well as discussions about the peer-reviewed versus student-edited debate, see
Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995); and also Monahan & Walker, supra note 31,
at 500 n.75.
40. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 16, at 582 ("Law professors cannot stand idly by and expect others
to investigate their problems.").
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inquiries into the presuppositions of legal doctrines and rules would be assigned
to the law schools.""' To the extent that legal theory generates research questions
and hypotheses amenable to empirical testing, those law professors generating legal
theories are certainly well-positioned and informed to pursue the related empirical
dimension.
Calls for more empirical data arrive at about the same time that commentators
both inside and outside the legal academy note that trends in legal education point
toward law schools' further integration with the larger university community.4 2
Presumably, law faculty who are engaged in empirical research activities-as are
many faculty in other academic departments and schools-will be better positioned
should legal education and scholarship continue to become more "university-like,"
as predicted. Moreover, if predictions that law schools will integrate further into
the general academic and university community come true, the importance of
incorporating broader methodologies into legal scholarship becomes greater if, for
no other reason, than to shore up its intellectual stature and reputation among the
broader community of scholars.
43
C. Reasons for This Dearth
Despite evidence that law professors recognize the need for more empirical
legal scholarship, relatively little emerges from the nation's law schools. Various
factors help explain this paradox and many fall loosely into two broad groups.
Both groups of factors relate directly to law professors' incentive structure. One
group pivots on the preferences of many individual law professors. Another group
of factors relates more to the particular, and potentially idiosyncratic, norms and
customs that shape many American law schools and faculties. Of course, the two
groups of factors frequently interact and influence each other simultaneously. Both
groups of factors combine to help form a relatively well shaped incentive structure
that remains largely skewed against empirical research and thereby disinclines
41. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 16, at 210.
42. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987) (arguing that law is increasingly becoming interdisciplinary); see
also Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1647, 1650 (1993) (noting that
law's earlier autonomous posture within the academy is being eroded by other disciplines' increasing
interest in the law). This trend is particularly evident at the nation's elite law schools.
43. Professor Schuck describes legal scholars' intellectual stature at the university level as already
precarious. See Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 329. Contributing mightily to any university's wariness
about law school academic stature is the absence of blind peer-review in the law review article selection
process. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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rational law professors from pursuing it."
1. It Is Hard Work
Professor Friedman makes a crucial point bluntly and plainly: "Empirical
research is hard work."'4 Such a statement is not meant to imply, however, that
non-empirical research is easy. Rather, the point is simply that empirical research
projects typically force legal scholars to confront a unique set of obstacles, many
of which stem from law schools' general and traditional orientation away from
empirical research. For example, law schools' current orientation and structure
reduce access to the tools necessary to complete empirical projects and, as a result,
contribute to such projects' overall degree of difficulty and increase the necessary
investment of time for their successful completion.'
Many worthwhile empirical projects require access to data, specialized
computer systems and software,47 as well as greater interaction with like-minded
colleagues who are usually found in other university schools and departments.
Although most law libraries comfortably serve the needs of scholars pursuing
theoretical and doctrinal legal research projects, law libraries typically do not
collect the full range of social scientific periodicals usually found in a general,
research university library. Consequently, empirical research projects usually
dislodge law professors from law libraries, or their offices, typically conveniently
located nearby. Additionally, many law professors "have never done any research
outside the familiar confines of our libraries."'  Of course, access to necessary
library and research materials is easily overcome. However, my point is not that
law faculties somehow go without what they need (although some assuredly do).
Rather, my smaller point is that those law professors pursuing empirical projects
in many instances confront structural barriers to crucial resources that do not
encumber their more theoretically or doctrinally inclined colleagues.
44. As Professor Schuck remarks, "rational academics will not do empirical research unless the
academy rewards them for their special time, trouble, and risk." Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 333.
45. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 774.
46. Though it is vexingly difficult to generalize, Professor Schuck notes that empirical work can
be "very time-consuming," as earlierempirical scholars found. See Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 332
(remarking that the median duration of empirical studies conducted by Legal Realists at Yale Law
School was five years (citing Schlegel, Moore supra note 20)).
47. Over the past few decades, however, most sophisticated statistical software packages-SPSS and
SAS being the most prominent in the social sciences-have become accessible to desktop (even laptop)
computer systems. Earlier generations of scholars were far more tethered to mainframe computer
systems, typically housed in centralized university computer centers.
48. See David P. Bryden, Scholarship About Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 641,645 (1992).
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2. Lack of Training
Even if law professors enjoyed a level of convenience regarding access to the
necessary research tools to conduct empirical research projects commensurate with
that enjoyed by scholars pursuing theoretical or doctrinal legal research, additional
barriers exist. Perhaps most important is the fact that most law professors do not
possess the requisite training or background that most sophisticated statistical work
requires.49 Fewer still possess the inclination and energy to acquire, update, or re-
tool their research skills or analytical repertoire. Empirical research projects,
particularly those that employ higher-level statistical techniques, require more than
the traditional legal reasoning and analytical skills that law schools impart to their
students and law faculties. If today only a small number of law schools offer a
single course in statistics or research designSrequired staples in many graduate
social science programs-even fewer did so years ago when many of today's law
professors were law students. Thus, the fact that many of today's law professors,
almost-but not-all of whom used to be law students, do not possess the necessary
skills to conduct empirical research should surprise few.
To offset this gap in expertise, law professors could collaborate with other
scholars who possess experience and expertise in empirical research. Collaboration
is a well-established norm in most academic disciplines, especially in the social and
hard sciences." Curiously, however, norms surrounding many legal scholars-in
stark contrast to other academic research as well as the Pepperdine Study-do not
emphasize collaboration. Despite a tradition of scholarly collaboration in many
other academic disciplines, law professors typically conduct their legal scholarship
themselves. 2
University planning might be another culprit dampening collaboration. For
example, law schools usually benefit from their own building or buildings, further
49. Results from Professor Nard's telephone survey identified law professors' lack of training as
the single most important barrier to increased empirical scholarship. See Nard, supra note 24, at 362
tbl.2.
50. Moreover, many of such courses or seminars that are presented focus on explaining the role of
social sciences (including statistics) in law or litigation. That is to say, they descriptively present
statistics. In contrast, fewer courses, only a handful come to mind, actually engage in teaching law
students how to do even elementary statistical analyses.
51. Notably, the Pepperdine Study's fourth author, Professor Fagan, holds an appointment in
Pepperdine University's Sociology Department. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 669. Moreover, I take
the author's attribution to suggest that Dr. Fagan's particular contribution to the project focused on the
study's technical and statistical aspects. See id.
52. Mounting anecdotal evidence suggests that the trend of non-collaborative legal
scholarship-while certainly still the norm-is eroding. See, e.g., Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 332
n.37.
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exacerbating a law professors' sense of isolation from colleagues found elsewhere
throughout the university and further blunts any collaborative impulses. Although
collaborative research does inject certain costs for such narrow, though critical,
purposes as promotion and tenure, other academic disciplines appear to have
discovered reasonable mechanisms to discern and assess individual contributions
to collaborative efforts. Moreover, the potential benefits that arise from collabora-
tion, particularly when it involves scholars from different disciplines, strike me as
sufficiently attractive as to overcome the related costs.
3. Exposure to Falsification Through Replication
Empirical research is far more amenable to falsification through subsequent
efforts by others at replication, thereby making it a slightly riskier genre. Clearly,
much of the theoretical work that fills law reviews involves scholars commenting
upon, challenging, chiding, debunking, or disagreeing with prior work.53 But at one
level, it is more difficult to falsify or disprove a theory than it is to falsify or
challenge results from empirical work. Theorists can certainly persuade readers
that one theory is better than another. This, however, is something quite different
from empirically corroborating or casting doubt over a theory's efficacy or a
study's results or conclusions. In this regard, numbers provide less shelter than
words. Consequently, legal theorists can advance their theoretical work and sleep
nights with greater comfort knowing that they will not wake up the next morning
to find their work challenged in a subsequent article by a scholar who cannot, for
example, replicate the original findings. That is, empirical work stands much more
exposed to the challenge of falsifiability by further, subsequent research.
Paradoxically, the amenability to falsification is one of empirical scholarship's
strengths.54 The greater persuasiveness of objectively disprovable hypotheses is
"intuitively obvious."55 Moreover, even the prospect of external empirical checks
on one's work fuels a certain level of humility that is sometimes absent in non-
empirical work.
A recent colloquy published in the StanfordLaw Review illustrates the benefits
that flow from replication of empirical research. Three separate articles by
Professors Cassell and Fowles (as co-authors) and Donohue combine to present
one of the more important empirical discussions about the effects of the Supreme
Court's Miranda56 decision on law enforcement. The lead article presents results
53. For evidence that law professors might write to, for, and about each other, see, e.g., Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How to Conduct a Conversation on Race-Standing, Imperial
Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051, 1056 (1998) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)).
54. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the
Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1018 (1989).
55. See Jonathan R. Macey, Law and the Social Sciences, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 173
(1997).
56. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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for and interpretation of a sophisticated empirical legal impact study.57 A
commentary article follows and presents results from an independent re-analysis
of the lead article's data.5" In the third article of the three-part colloquy, Professors
Cassel and Fowles comment on Professors Donohue's article in a brief, insightful
rejoinder.59 The efforts at replicating empirical research and the robust discussion
that ensues substantially strengthens readers' understanding of the underlying
research questions and further clarifies avenues for future research. This colloquy
aptly illustrates how efforts to replicate and falsify scholarship can generate
enormous benefits to the scholarly enterprise and our knowledge bases. Despite
such benefits, however, the risks such efforts pose for professional embarrassment
serve as yet another disincentive for law professors to pursue such work."
4. Lack of Prestige
Many current leading scholars agree that empirical legal scholarship garners
less prestige than its more theoretical counterpart. 6' Although many will quibble
on how best to define or operationalize the elusive concept of prestige, few quarrel
with its presence and influence within the legal academy.62 Thus, in order "to get
the richest rewards available within the modem legal academic community a
professor has to do 'theory'." '6 3 The reason for this is not entirely clear, but the
legal academy's tradition of favoring theoretical and, to a lesser extent, doctrinal
legal scholarship surely is one factor contributing to the relative lack of empirical
57. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1060 (1998).
58. See John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147,
1149n.11 (1998).
59. See Paul G. Cassell and Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda: Coincidence
or Consequence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (1998).
60. At least one commentator has noted that "[tihe best test ofcertainty we have is good science-the
science of publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus and peer review." PETER
HUBER, GALILEo'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 228 (1991).
61. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 16, at 766 (arguing that empirical work is "less honored" than
theoretical); Posner, Against, supra note 16, at 10 (arguing that legal theorists reap the "richest rewards
available within the modem legal academic community").
62. Indeed, prestige, like water, appears to permeate all quarters of the legal academy that are not
assiduously designed to guard against it, seal it off, and blunt its impact. See, e.g., Merritt & Reskin,
supra note 13, at 240 tbl.4 (arguing that law faculty candidate's opportunities for employment at a top
law school are enhanced by possessing a J.D. degree from an "elite" (read: prestigious) law school);
Ronald J. Krotozynski, Jr., Commentary -Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy,
and Redemption, 77 TEx. L. REV. 321,329-31 (1998) (discussing the role of prestige on the law review
article selection process).
63. Posner, Against, supra note 16, at 10.
819
legal scholarship.'M Also, the failure of early, notable empirically sensitive projects
to ignite a tradition of empirical legal scholarship and carve out a place of stature
for empirical research further solidified theoretical and doctrinal's domination over
law schools' scholarly tradition.65
5. Lack of Internal Institutional Incentives
Just as risky as generalizations about legal scholarship, or even well-defined
sub-groups of legal scholarship6 are generalizations about law schools themselves.
Law schools vary just as law professors and legal scholarship vary. The existence
of important and sometimes enormous variations, however, does not preclude
appropriately caveated generalizations. After all, certain aspects of legal education
still link most American law schools. One such generalization is that
many-perhaps even most-law schools possess incentive structures that were
erected in eras that favored theoretical and doctrinal scholarship over empirical. 6
7
The current internal incentive structure confronting many law professors interacts
with the prestige variable, discussed above.6' That is to say, one reason that'law
schools' internal incentive structures are not more favorable toward empirical
research is partly a function of the relative lack of prestige accorded to it within the
legal academy. One commentator suggests that even those law professors who
possess the requisite skills and are provided with the necessary resources would
hesitate before venturing into empirical research projects, unless they perceived
"unique rewards at the top of the empirical mountain."'69
The promotion and tenure process serves as one crucial piece of an amorphous
internal institutional incentive structure that influences many law professors,
particularly the untenured ones. Given the magnitude of the personal and
professional stakes involved in the promotion and tenure process, it is far from
surprising that so few tenure-track law professors are inclined to engage in
activities that might reduce their prospects for success. With a well-worn path to
64. See Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 330 (arguing that tradition is the "most obvious" reason for
a general neglect of empirical research by legal scholars); see also Clark Byse, Legal Scholarship, Legal
Realism and the Law Teacher's Intellectual Schizophrenia, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 9, 16-18 (1988).
65. One obvious example and one obvious counter-example exist. The legal realists, especially
those based at Yale Law School, are frequently cited as a failed effort to ignite sustained interest in
empirical legal scholarship. See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN, supra note 20; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REAuSM AT YALE (1986). The obvious counter-example is the law and economics movement-more
specifically, its small but growing empirical vein-spawned at the University of Chicago Law School.
See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THELOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALSOFTHE LEGAL PROFESSION 166
(1993) (noting that "[lI]aw and economics is today a permanent, institutionalized feature of American
legal education.").
66. See Bryden, supra note 48, at 641 (proposing ways to enrich legal scholarship).
67. See, e.g., Posner, Summary, supra note 4, at 367-68 n.4 (noting that the methods and
organization of legal education are "inhospitable" to empirical research).
68. See supra Part ll.C.4.
69. See Bryden, supra note 48, at 645-46.
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tenure already cleared by a tradition of theoretical and doctrinal scholarly
production and productivity, those who veer off this path and onto the less traveled
path of empirical scholarly production assume some level of additional risk.70 As
previously discussed, empirical legal scholarship presently lacks the same level of
prestige afforded to other genres, particularly theoretical. 7' Also, senior faculty
members are comparatively less familiar with empirical projects and, as a result,
might feel less comfortable assessing them. Another factor increasing risk for
empirical projects within the tenure context is that frequently empirical projects
require substantial investments of time, which endures as among scholars' most
precious commodities.
72
Compounding the risk posed by a potentially significant investment of time is
uncertainty. Specifically, somewhat peculiar to empirical work is that, ex ante,
researchers frequently do not know what the data might say until after the data have
been gathered, coded, and analyzed. 3 As Professor Schuck notes, until analysis
begins a researcher frequently does not know whether "one will make important
new findings or 'merely' confirm what everybody, in retrospect, 'already
knows."'
74
Finally, few success stories exist that might serve as possible role models for
younger law faculty. Because "law schools have not made empirical research a
major part of the teaching or scholarly mission," success stories involving empirical
research projects either at the institutional or individual level are difficult, although
not impossible, to identify. 5 Although many law professors have achieved great
individual success through their empirical legal scholarship, "most law professors
are advised that it is dangerous to invest too much in sociolegal research, and most
follow that advice. 76 Individually, each factor reduces law professors' incentive
to conduct empirical work, especially during their pre-tenure period. Cumulatively,
the factors' potential drag on tenure and other professional prospects might
persuade some law professors that the risks posed by empirical legal scholarship
outweigh its benefits.
Paradoxically, the relative dearth of empirical legal scholarship generates one
critical strategic advantage for young, untenured legal scholars. The underdevelop-
70. At least they perceive some additional level of risk. For example, Professor Nard's telephone
survey revealed that, overall, 30% of those law professors surveyed felt that empirical legal scholarship
was not well received in the promotion and tenure process. See Nard, supra note 24, at 362 tl.2.
71. See supra Part ll.C.4.
72. See Schuck, Why, supra note 14, at 332.
73. See id. at 331.
74. See id.
75. See Garth, Book Review, supra note 22, at 607 (reviewing SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN, supra note
20).
76. See id.
ment in the field creates far greater opportunities for making an original contribu-
tion to legal scholarship." Given the abundance of thinking and writing in many
areas of the law, such as constitutional law, it becomes increasingly difficult to find
an underexamined scholarly comer of law to say something new. In contrast, the
list of legal research questions that would benefit from empirical analysis already
staggers and continues to grow.
6. Lack of External Institutional Incentives
Empirical legal scholarship lacks sustained and consistent external funding
support. Unlike many of the social sciences, and even more unlike the hard and
physical sciences, law school funding is largely internal and frequently tuition-
driven. Put slightly differently, law school funding does not, as a general rule,
pivot on the faculty's ability to secure external grant funding from either private or
public sources. While literally billions of dollars are spent on research in this
country for all sorts of research projects, only a minute amount flows into legal
research projects of any kind, let alone empirical studies.78 Relative to some of
their academic counterparts, legal scholars resemble "beggars fighting for a handful
of coins." 9
Obvious and some less obvious consequences flow from the absence of any
meaningful external financial support for empirical legal research projects. The
relatively small amount of external financial support for empirical legal research
projects is yet another reason not to pursue such research. Moreover, the output
of those willing to pursue a small slice of the research funding pie will be small.
One less obvious consequence stemming from a lack of external financial support
is the harm to data gathering. Because data gathering, which resides at the heart
of much empirical work, is both a time-consuming and labor-intensive enterprise,
it is also frequently expensive. Data production's relatively high costs and the
relatively low investment in empirical legal research create a scarcity of data and
datasets relevant to legal scholars. Without the benefit of data, even the less time-
sensitive secondary analyses cannot proceed. The full extent of the harms to
empirical research set into motion by underinvestment in data is difficult to gauge.
Two recent examples underscore how investment in and development of data
can increase our understanding of crucial legal issues. One dataset, the Civil
77. See Bryden, supra note 48, at 646-47 (noting a lack of innovative teaching materials).
78. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 779 (noting that what one well-known source of federal
funding, within the National Science Foundation, spends annually on legal research would not sustain
high energy physics research "for one day").
79. See id. Of course, many scholars who depend upon external funds envy law faculty's reliance
on internal funds.
80. When I speak of data gathering, I refer broadly to all aspects relating to the identifying,
gathering, cleaning, coding, etc., of data.
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Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992,81 consists of two separate samples of forty-
five of the nation's seventy-five most populous counties.8 2 The data sampled
approximately one-third of the more than 248 million people reported in the 1990
U.S. population.83 The dataset, the first large-scale source of such data of its kind,
included a general civil case sample as well as a civil jury trial data sample. 4 Data
in the general civil case sample included tort, contract, and property cases from the
sampled counties. 5 The smaller, more detailed jury trial sample included such
information as prevailing party, disposition time, and amount of damages awarded,
if any. 6 As a result, this rich source of data supplies a crucial empirical dimension
to an array of key research questions that remain the subject of intense, on-going
theoretical and public debates.8 7 Indeed, one commentator has already noted the
important scholarship spawned by these data.88
A second example involves a grant to RAND for a report on the implementa-
tion of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.89 Under the federal legislation, ten
81. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ- 154346, SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES
(1995) [hereinafter, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ- 153177, SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE
COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995) [hereinafter, TORT CASES IN LARGE
COUNTIES]. The data is the product of Civil Trial Court Network which is a collaborative effort of the
National Center for State Courts and the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. See Theodore Eisenberg et
al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
433, 434 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Outcomes].
82. See Eisenberg et al., Outcomes, supra note 8 1, at 434 (citing TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES,
supra note 81).
83. See id. (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA
BOOK 18 (1994)).
84. See id. (citing CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, supra note 81).
85. See id. at 434-35.
86. See id.
87. One recent example involves questions surrounding punitive damages in tort cases, a frequent
subject of civil justice reform efforts at both the state and local levels. An entire volume of a recent
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES focused on tort reform issues. See 26 J. LEGAL STUD. (1997). This
particular volume included two articles that debated the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from
analyses of data from the CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992. See Theodore Eisenberg et
al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg et
al., Predictability] (interpreting the data as indicating that punitive damages are awarded within a broad
but predictable range); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable,
and Rationale? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (1997) (rejecting Eisenberg's
interpretation of the data and arguing instead that the study reflects the arbitrary nature of punitive
damage awards).
88. See Polinsky, supra note 87, at 663-64 (noting that Eisenberg et al.'s empirical studies are
among "the most ambitious ... undertaken to date" and that they will deservedly "receive considerable
attention in popular and academic circles").
89. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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district courts, denoted "pilot" district courts, were required to implement a plan
that incorporated various aspects of case management principles the Act deemed
desirable.9°  The legislation also included an evaluation component. The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts selected RAND to perform the evaluation
of the ten pilot districts.91 The result, one commentator noted, was "probably the
single biggest investment in empirical research about civil justice in the United
States history."'  The study shed important new light on whether and, if so, how,
the newly enacted Civil Justice Reform Act achieved its stated goals of making our
court system more just, speedy, and inexpensive. 93 Results from the pilot study
have already made a significant contribution to the scholarly literature.94
Both examples of externally-funded empirical legal research projects illustrate
a two-fold point. The development and production of data germane to legal
scholarship remain a distinctly rare event. The two recent examples described
above form a small oasis amid a vast, ard intellectual landscape void of much-
needed data. Also, although these two examples are quite new, they have already
generated important scholarly contributions. Future legal scholarship will
assuredly benefit from these rich sources of data.
I. NULLiUS IN VERBA:95 EMERGING TYPES OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
Having just argued about the relative dearth of empirical legal scholarship and
identified reasons for its neglect, it remains important to note that empirical legal
research is on the rise.' I now turn to describing emerging trends in the little
empirical work that exists. Much of the existing empirical legal scholarship falls
loosely into one or more of three broad categories: judicial opinion coding or case
content analysis, descriptive, and inferential. 97
90. See James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 17-18 (1997).
91. See id. at 18.
92. Garth, Observations, supra note 23, at 103. The $4.5 million grant to RAND for its study and
report in terms of magnitude compares to the $1.2 million grant to Civil Litigation Research Project at
the University of Wisconsin during the late 1970s. See id. at n.3.
93. See Kakalik et al., supra note 90, at 17-18.
94. See generally Symposium, Evaluation of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. I
(1997) (focusing on RAND's empirical evaluation of the Civil Justice Reform Act). It is important to
note, however, that many scholars have criticized the RAND study. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 24, at
361 n.68; Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the
Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1998) (commenting that the RAND
Study is not useful in analyzing the market of high stakes litigation).
95. Nullius in verba (or "trust not words") is the Royal Society of London's motto. See Steve Jones,
The Set Within the Skull, N.Y. REV. BOOKs, Nov. 6, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 18693830.
96. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
97. Again, it is important to recall the narrow definition of empirical legal scholarship used in this
article. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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One major type of empirical legal scholarship seeks to characterize judicial
opinions on the basis of their content. That is, judicial opinion content is analyzed
and coded for subsequent analyses. This type of research benefits from certain
advantages. The supply of raw data-case law-is significant, perhaps inexhaustible,
and constantly increasing. Content analysis also benefits from "the natural
laboratory provided by the heterogeneous development of the common law" in fifty
separate jurisdictions, each possessing its own legal characteristics." In addition,
changes in common law rules have the potential to impact important aspects of
modem life.' Efforts to study these changes can provide important clues about an
array of common law areas.'01 Finally, knowing more about the possible
consequences of changing common law rules would assist legislatures and courts
considering implementing such a change.' 0 '
Notwithstanding the important benefits of content analysis, some factors limit
its usefulness and development as a methodology.1 2 One principal problem is that
the methodology relies in crucial ways on the subjective determinations of what
judicial opinions say and mean by the researcher engaging in content analysis and
coding. Various protocols can be employed to ensure greater internal validation
and consistency.0 3 But the integrity of content analysis rests upon the dual
propositions that a consensus exists on how reasonable people would characterize
any particular case and that case characterizations will remain stable over time.
In addition, judicial opinion characterization necessarily relies upon a narrow
slice of our judicial system that may or may not closely resemble the entire legal
universe. For example, tort law only comprises just over approximately three
percent of all cases filed that reach a judge or jury for disposition. 1o' Of this three
percent that results in bench or jury verdicts, some exist as unpublished opinions. i"i
Finally, even within the universe of published opinions, not all are officially
98. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
99. See Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common
Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-At-Will, 45 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 999, 1001 (1995).
100. See id. at 1001-02.
101. Seeid.at102.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 993-94 n.33 (1991) (discussing the methods used
in the study to ensure accuracy).
104. See TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES, supra note 81, at 5.
105. I use the term "judicial opinion" loosely in this context. Courts generate an array of official
workproduct (e.g., judicial orders, memorandum, judgments, opinions).
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published and wind up in familiar legal reporter series.'" Of course, even though
the percentage of cases filed that eventually wind up going to trial and culminating
in a written, published judicial opinion is exceedingly small, it yields a dispropor-
tionate amount of importance and influence-albeit indirectly. An important
function of written published judicial opinions is to shape future litigants'
expectations and predictions about what might happen if their case should proceed
to trial. Moreover, these expectations and predictions in turn influence the nuanced
decisional analyses about whether to even initiate, let alone litigate, potential legal
claims."'
Numerous factors make content analysis difficult. Regrettably, not all legal
opinions are well written or clear. In addition, changes to common law rules are
frequently unannounced or hidden. Although on occasion courts expressly change
or make new law, more frequently courts characterize such changes "simply as the
application of existing precedent to slightly different factual circumstances.""
The many fonts of common law changes inject additional complications in content
analysis. Moreover, the common law itself, borne out of its numerous and evolving
sources, is iterative.'"
Despite these and other difficulties, important examples of this methodology
exist and influence the legal literature. Notable examples include efforts to analyze
such topics as constitutional torts, " 0 employment-at-will,"' and education law."'
Professor Morriss recently set forth a helpful framework designed to inject more
coherence and structure into researchers' efforts to solve the vexingly complicated
problem of dating common law changes through analysis of judicial opinions."'
A second discernible type of empirical legal scholarship, and perhaps the most
common, includes scholarship that uses data descriptively. One or more variables
of interest can be described and presented according to the many properties they
possess. These properties can convey crucial information not readily discernible
from content analysis of judicial opinions, including the following: means,
medians, modes, rates, proportions, and frequency counts. Although these
properties possess intrinsic value for the information they convey, also beneficial
106. See Morriss, supra note 99, at 1038-39 n.152; see also William L. Reynolds & William M.
Richman, An Evaluation ofLimited Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The Price of
Reform, 48 U. CI. L. REV. 573-74 (1981) (noting a decline in the rate of published appellate court
opinions).
107. See Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL.
JURY SYSTEM 307 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter Schuck, Mapping]; see also George L. Priest
& Benjamin Klien, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
108. See Morriss, supra note 99, at 1002.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987).
111. See, e.g., Morriss, supra note 99, 1004-20.
112. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
COURTS (1982); Heise, State, supra note 16; Heise, Equal, supra note 16.
113. See Morriss, supra note 99.
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is that they contribute to an empirical foundation upon which further, frequently
even more sophisticated, empirical work can build. Unlike the content analysis
type, discussed above, empirical research that employs descriptive statistics
frequently involves data-gathering from sources generally not housed in many law
school library collections or, more accurately, law reporter series." 4
Numerical evidence presented descriptively frequently is offered to illustrate
how two things (or variables) might differ or relate. An example of the former
includes Tables 1 ' and 2' in the Pepperdine Study. These Tables, which report
data generated by a survey instrument, illustrate attitudinal differences between and
among different groups of respondents on issues relating to the threat of eviden-
tiary suppression.17 Descriptive analysis can also illustrate how two variables
relate to one another. For example, the legal validity of certain employment tests
can be examined partly by plotting employees' test scores with their job perfor-
mance scores. A correlation coefficient can provide a numerical expression of the
relation between an employer's test and employees' performance and, by
implication, the test's validity."'
A third type of empirical legal scholarship includes studies that use statistics
inferentially. In certain instances researchers may wish to advance generalizations
relevant to a general population yet base the generalizations on data drawn from a
sample of cases, or subjects from the object population. Crucial to such research
is that the underlying sample is drawn from the object population in a random, non-
biased manner. Inferential statistical techniques used within the context of a well-
structured research design permit inferences regarding selected attributes about a
population based solely on statistical manipulation of a random sample from that
population. Moreover, inferential statistics facilitate determinations about whether
random chance alone can explain certain observable results. A few examples of
this genre illustrate its properties as well as their analytical power.
For example, a defendant in a capital murder trial introduced evidence of
potential racial bias in the government's administration of the death penalty." 9
114. Admittedly, our conceptions of law school libraries, their collections, and uses continue to
evolve, particularly as new technologies are deployed. Due to existing information technology,
especially the World Wide Web, along with long-standing inter-library loan policies, the traditional
"four walls" of a law school library have become increasingly less relevant. See generally Michael
Heise, Closing One Gap But Creating Another?: A Response to Dean Perritn and Comments on the
Internet, Law Schools, and Legal Education, 33 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
115. SeePerrinetal.,supra note I, at 721.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. For a visual display of this example, see DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISICAL
EVIDENCE IN LinGATION 28 (1986) (Exhibit 1. 11 (a)).
119. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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Evidence proffered in briefs prominently featured an exhaustively detailed
empirical study of the death penalty led by Professor David Baldus. 20 The Baldus
Study examined more than 200 independent variables' 2 and concluded that, among
other things, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more
likely to receive a death sentence than similar defendants who killed African-
Americans. 2 2 Both the District Court 23 and the U.S. Supreme Court2 4 noted the
Baldus Study's validity in their respective efforts to assess whether the death
penalty's application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'25
Whether requirements imposed upon law enforcement officials by the Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona 2 6 have generated any social costs is the
subject of important, recent empirical work. '27 Specifically, legal scholars examine
Miranda's potential contribution to a decline in clearance rates for "composite
groupings of violent and property crimes."' 2 8 A study conducted by Paul G.
Cassell employed an interrupted time-series model, analyzed 46 years of data, and
concluded that Miranda generates important social costs by "hampering the ability
of the police to solve crimes."29 Moreover, subsequent re-analysis of the data
offers general, though not total corroboration.
31
Civil law-particularly tort law and tort reform efforts-has also spawned
important empirical legal scholarship recently. Professor Eisenberg performed
sophisticated statistical analysis on a sample of punitive damage awards testing for,
among other properties, their predictability and relation to the underlying
compensatory damage award.' 3' Findings from his study provide critical insight
into heated public and scholarly debates about tort reform in general and punitive
award caps in particular.'32
120. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
121. See id. at 340-69.
122. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
123. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 580 F. Supp. 338, 352 (1984).
124. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87.
125. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that although the Baldus Study was valid, the petitioner's claims
failed under applicable law. See id. at 292 n.7, 318-19.
126. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Reassessment]; Cassell & Fowles, supra note 57; Donohue, supra
note 58.
128. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 57, at 1060.
129. See id. at 1132.
13Q. See Donohue, supra note 58, at 1169-72. 73-74 tbls.I & II.
131. See Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 87. In his response article, Professor Polinsky
takes issue with Professor Eisenberg's interpretation of the results but not the analyses or methodology.
See Polinsky, supra note 87, at 664 ("For purposes of this comment, I will assume that their
methodology is appropriate and that their empirical results are correct.").
132. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Eisenberg et al.,
Predictability, supra note 87, at 623-24; John Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986); Editorial, Trial Lawyers' Triumph, WASH. PosT, Mar. 19,
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IV. THE PEPPERDINE STUDY
This background, developed in Parts 11133 and 11I131 above, helps create a
context by which the Pepperdine Study can be placed and assessed for its
methodological contributions. The Pepperdine Study is an example of the second
type of empirical legal scholarship 35 as it largely descriptively summarizes original
data generated by a survey instrument. The general subject considered-the costs
and benefits of the exclusionary rule-is important not only to the legal research
literature but also because of the exclusionary rule's practical consequences for
many individuals and our criminal justice system. A former Chief Justice to the
Supreme Court, advancing the argument that deterrence of police misconduct is the
only justification for the exclusionary rule, bemoaned the absence of an empirical
basis supporting the rule's sole justification. 136 Thus, the authors of the Pepperdine
Study persuasively make the easy case for why more knowledge about the
exclusionary rule's actual effects would assist in analyzing it.137 The authors also
review the relevant literature, with particular and extensive emphasis on existing
empirical studies.' 3' Their discussion makes clear how their study advances
existing research and identifies the particular research void it seeks to fill.,39
Having carefully identified and operationalized their research question into a
testable hypothesis amenable to empirical analysis, the authors take equal care to
lower readers' expectations." 4 Such an effort is warranted for a number of
reasons, some of which fall wholly outside the researchers' control. One set of
reasons stems from the nature of empirical research generally. Those who have
undertaken empirical research projects or studied them with appropriate care are
frequently among those most likely to appreciate this research genre's limitations.
It is difficult to over-emphasize the limited incremental nature of well-crafted
empirical research contributions to our knowledge base. The authors of the
Pepperdine Study appropriately evidence a keen awareness of the modest scope of
their research project when they write: "We creep toward the goal of a better
1996, available in 1996 WL 3069750.
133. See supra notes 12-92 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 94- 131 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
136. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the absence of data in support of the exclusionary rule).
137. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 711-36.
138. Seeid. at711-12.
139. See id. at 678-710.
140. Seeid. at711-12.
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means of enforcing Fourth Amendment rights.' ' 4'
Another set of reasons that justify caution and modesty stem from conditions
peculiar to exclusionary rule impact research. Notwithstanding the Pepperdine
Study's helpful contribution, whether the exclusionary rule deters illegal police
conduct, there remains a vexingly complicated research question and one that
thrusts researchers into murky areas inhabited by well-guarded human motivations
within a complex social model. 42 Complicating an already complex inquiry is a
paucity of helpful data. 41 Indeed, the lack of relevant, germane, and helpful data
surely contributed to the authors' decision to generate, gather, and code original
data. Any one of these reasons help ensure that additions to our knowledge base
will emerge in a gradual and incremental fashion. Cumulatively, these factors pose
significant challenges to research efforts, such as the one undertaken by the authors
of the Pepperdine Study.'"
As the Pepperdine Study makes clear, precious little is known about whether,
and if so how, the exclusionary rule works in practice, particularly how it
influences police conduct, legal and otherwise. What is known, more often than
not, derives from impressionistic or anecdotal reports or evidence. 45 Even more
dramatic, what little empirical work that exists is limited methodologically as well
as by such technical issues as sampling and research design.'" The exclusionary
rule's thin current knowledge base about its effects is all the more surprising given
the important consequences that flow from the rule's application.
Although the Pepperdine Study seeks to achieve two distinct goals, only one
goal, "to determine what effect the exclusionary rule has had on police conduct,"
is the particular focus of the study's empirical component. 47 In many respects the
Pepperdine Study broadly achieves what it sets out to accomplish. The Study sheds
new light on an important legal question from an empirical perspective, generates
new knowledge and data, and, more fundamentally, "build[s] on what has come
before."'"
Despite the Pepperdine Study's general contribution to its field, important
issues limit the contribution's scope and extent. Specifically, research design and
methodological and technical issues blunt the Pepperdine Study's findings. The
authors use a survey instrument to generate original data which they treat
141. See id. at 678-79.
142. See id. (citing Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHi. L. REV. 665, 716 (1970)). As the authors of the Pepperdine Study note, Oaks concluded that a full,
satisfactory inquiry is impossible. See id. at 678.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 711 n.366 (discussing more hurdles for empirical research on the exclusionary rule).
145. See id. at 711.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 678. The Pepperdine Study's other goal is to "examine whether other remedies are
capable of deterring and compensating for police misconduct so as to achieve maximum benefit with
the least cost." See id.
148. See id. at 678.
830
[Vol. 26: 807, 1999] The Importance ofBeing Empirical
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
descriptively. 4 9 Given that so little is known about the possible effects of the
exclusionary rule on police conduct, the study's use of descriptive rather than
inferential statistics is not surprising. 5 ' Although inferential statistics frequently
are poised to offer more probative insights than their descriptive counterparts they
impose more rigorous burdens on the researcher and study design. Nevertheless,
helpful descriptive work, such as the Pepperdine Study, contributes to an
intellectual foundation upon which future inferential work might rely.
Research designs that use a survey instrument as a source of data are the
subject of extensive debates that fall well outside the scope of this Article.'
Suffice it to say, however, self-reported survey data possess certain benefits as well
as impose consequential costs. One such cost is that people have been known to
lie in their responses to survey questions. Indeed, comments to a pilot version of
the survey instrument are at the very least suggestive that this possibility might
adversely affect the data generated by the Pepperdine Study, particularly questions
designed to ferret out law enforcement officials' truthfulness.'52 Notwithstanding
the standard pledges of complete anonymity to respondents along with protocols
designed to ensure anonymity, it is not unreasonable to harbor some doubts about
the veracity of responses to survey questions not offered under oath concerning the
respondent's truthfulness.'53 It simply stands to reason that law enforcement
officials capable of committing perjury are likewise capable of responding
untruthfully to survey questions.'54 And if the officials were not at least capable
of committing perjury then little reason exists to have included such questions in
the survey.
In addition to questions surrounding data reliability, another aspect that limits
the utility of data gathered through surveys is that survey instruments, at least the
instrument used in the Pepperdine Study, gather data on what people say they have
done, do, or will do. Whether and, if so, to what degree what people say they do
comports with what they actually do is far from certain. In a perfect world, one
with unlimited research budget- independent third-party researchers would gather
149. Seeid. at713-19.
150. See id. at 678-79 (acknowledging the limited empirical data previously gathered).
151. The debates are rich. See, e.g., Eleanor Singer, Editor's Introduction, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. s I-
s3 (1987); Tom W. Smith, The Art ofAsking Questions, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. s95-s 108 (1987); Robert
M. Groves, Research on Survey Data Quality, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. s 156-s 172 (1987).
152. The Pepperdine Study's authors note that the law enforcement officials they dealt with were
"understandably sensitive about even the suggestion that their officers might occasionally misrepresent
what happened during a search or an interview. Accordingly, we eliminated four questions that asked
the respondents about their own truthfulness." See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 718.
153. See id. at 725-27.
154. See id. at 677,725 (discussing the loss of police integrity as a cost of the exclusionary rule and
the possible effects of police perjury on the survey).
data on what police officers actually do, rather than rely on self-reports. What
people do and what people say they do are two different questions. Consequently,
data on these questions differ in important respects.
Two other potential problems to the research design and survey methodology
used in the Pepperdine Study stem from how the respondents reacted to the
instrument as well as their reaction to being the subject of a study. First, the survey
instrument itself might disturb the very information the researchers seek to
measure.' 55 Second, just knowing that they are participating in a study might be
enough to alter information gathered from respondents.'56 It is far from clear
whether either problem is present in the Pepperdine Study, but both are serious
problems and the authors suggest that the former problem-instrument reactiv-
ity-arose.'57 Specifically, the authors noted respondents' intense and unanimous
reactions to questions concerning police perjury on a pilot survey instrument.'
Respondents candidly implied that they would be unable to answer such questions
honestly, notwithstanding assurances of confidentiality from the researchers. 9
Accordingly, the researchers' eliminated four items from the final survey
instrument addressing respondents' own truthfulness."W The final survey retained
more broadly phrased questions addressing the respondents' knowledge of
perjurious conduct by others.' 6' Yet the researchers' discussion of the results of
these questions reveals unease with data reliability.' 62
Finally, issues involving the Pepperdine Study's sample size and response
rates further limit the force and generalizability of its findings. The sample size,
essentially restricted to law enforcement officers working in Ventura County,
California, 63 makes the Pepperdine Study more closely resemble an extensive case
study. Implications that can be properly drawn from data from law enforcement
officials from a single county pivot largely on the representativeness of Ventura
County law enforcement."6 Paradoxically, the authors' review of prior empirical
155. See PAUL E. SPECTER, RESEARCH DESIGNS 25 (198 1).
156. See id. at 27. This problem, commonly referred to as the Hawthorne Effect, is named after well-
known studies of Western Electric worker productivity during the 1930s. See id; see also FRrrz J.
ROETHUSBERGER & WILIAM J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939).
157. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 711-12.
158. See id. at718.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. Whether law enforcement officials would candidly report even this information is not
assured, particularly in light of their responses to self reports.
162. See id. at 725 ("Based upon the preliminary responses we received to our questions about police
perjury, it was not surprising that the participants in the study were reluctant to acknowledge the
existence of police deception or perjury in their agency.").
163. See id. at 713. I say "essentially" only because the Pepperdine Study also incorporates 55
responses from law enforcement officials from agencies located outside of Ventura County and
"throughout" California. See id. In addition, the Study also includes 80 responses from first-year law
students at Pepperdine University School of Law. See id. The bulk of the respondents, 411, work in
Ventura County, California. See id.
164. The authors discuss the implications of this point briefly. See id. at 712-13.
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scholarship reveals a key factor that casts some doubt on their own study.
Specifically, an earlier study endeavors to contrast evidentiary suppression motions
in two jurisdictions, Washington, D.C. and Chicago. 65 The Pepperdine Study
reports that the starkly different results stem from the existence of "important
differences in the criminal justice systems of the two cities, differences so striking
that meaningful comparisons could not be made."' 66 However, the same or
different characteristics that distinguished the criminal justice systems in
Washington, D.C. and Chicago during the 1960s and 1970s might also distinguish
Ventura County from other American jurisdictions. If so, generalizations from the
Ventura County data should only be drawn with extraordinary care, if at all.
Although questions exist about the potential representativeness of the data
drawn from largely Ventura County law enforcement officials to their counterparts
working elsewhere, response rates also cast some doubt over the respondents'
representativeness of Ventura County law enforcement officials. 67 Simply put,
low response rates hamstring the Pepperdine Study. The authors reveal response
rates to their survey ranging from a high of forty-two percent to a low of twenty
percent." Although no bright line exists, when fewer than one-half of those
surveyed respond, one has to begin to wonder whether the characteristics and
incentives of those who elected to participate systematically differ from the
majority of those who declined to respond. If no such differences exist then the
low response rate should not inject bias into the sample. If such differences exist
then the specter of bias arises. And bias would threaten to undermine the very
heart of the study-the quality of its data. The problem, of course, is that one simply
cannot tell. And it is the researcher who shoulders the burden of removing this
doubt.
V. CONCLUSION
Where empirical questions lurk, data warrant at least as much respect as that
accorded opinion and words. 69 The Pepperdine Study and its authors deserve
praise for endeavoring to empirically test questions relating to the exclusionary rule
165. See id. at 695 (citing Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Cm. L. REV 665, 687 (1970)).
166. See id. at 696.
167. Again, most respondents work in Ventura County, California. See supra note 163.
168. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 713. The 20 percent response rate for the "the other officers"
group is particularly troublesome. See id. at 713 n.379. So much so as to perhaps render this data
unreliable, especially to fulfill the desired role as a comparative baseline.
169. Professor Donohue takes an even stronger position. See Donohue, supra note 58, at 1169
("Data wan-ants greater respect than opinion and verbiage.").
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that are frequently shrouded by complicated human motivation. 170 That the authors
approached this important legal question from an empirical perspective is by itself
notable, particularly given the current state of legal scholarship which remains
dominated by theoretical and doctrinal work. Theoretical and doctrinal scholar-
ship's dominant position in the legal literature is not surprising, especially given
the particular demands empirical research places upon scholars and the institutional
and other incentive structures many law professors confront.
The authors of the Pepperdine Study, of course, overcame these obstacles and
resisted incentives to avoid empirical research. Our legal literature would be
enriched if more academics, particularly law professors, became more engaged in
empirical legal research and produced more of it. Increased production of
empirical scholarship would enhance and supplement the legal literature as well as
our understanding of crucial legal questions. Empirical work sheds important light
on old legal issues and identifies and speaks to issues that the more traditional
theoretical and doctrinal genres cannot reach. While the authors correctly note
their study "nibble[s] around the edges" of their research question, 7' such nibbles
are to be expected. In most instances advancements in knowledge creep
incrementally, and often, in painstakingly slow fashion. Moreover, such nibbles
constitute the bulk of empirical research.
It is within this tradition that the Pepperdine Study contributes to the research
literature. In addition to illustrating empirical legal scholarship's comparative
advantages for questions concerning the exclusionary rule's impacts on law
enforcement conduct, however, the Pepperdine Study also illustrates many of the
challenges that confront much empirical research. These challenges include those
relating to research design, methodology, and response rates. Accordingly, the
Pepperdine Study's findings and generalizations drawn from them should be
approached with due caution. That said, the Pepperdine Study is among the best
such studies of a vexingly difficult research question.
170. See Perrin et al., supra note 1, at 755.
171. See id. (quoting Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
Cin. L. REV. 665,715 (1970)).
